TELEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE

Science as the abstraction of knowledge. An abstraction in the sense that immediate human experience does not predicate itself as knowledge, it instead constructs allegories of immediate experience, of Lebenswelten (metaphors and mythologies.) These could even be classsified as the original abstractions: signs, mythical representations, metaphors for novel experiences which co-created or invented mysticism and religion. As s a product of the semiolinguistic process, something outside, something external to the mind is pulling in all this experiential momentum of identity while the primary factors of the language-acquiring intelligence are attributing signs (referents) to the immediate experience and from these signs become everlasting objects of myths. So the remainder of cultures, the cornerstones or status of cultures are part of the topology of culture that transforms the state space of historical time. If the category of knowledge is the ultimate piece of philosophical abstraction (we could speak of the 'concept' of knowledge) that we have no epistemology, no knowledge about what knowledge really is or even what any thinking about knowledge means when it seeks to identify or posits questions about the meaning or essence of knowledge. 'Knowing' and 'knowledge' are grouped among many of the terms which came from nous, that Greek word for 'mind'. 'Knowing' is essentially non-different from 'thinking' or 'endowing'. 'To know' is 'to think' and thinking is conscious of its object. Knowledge is always on the approach of time and the continuation of thinking inside time. Science is that even more abstract mode of knowledge that is derived from thinking. Methodological science which grew out of a crisis in scientific thought and the organization of nature with the physical problems of geocentric cosmology and anthropocentric theology. The need to reduce science to a method, taking it out of the realm of human thinking about nature and or natural philosophy and natural science. 'Scientific method' is the self-distanced, external mode of empirical science. Empirical science becomes the image by which the scientific method itself is produced. (Out of empirical evidence is, again, the abstract experience of proof). Systems are built, out of 18th and 19th century sciences, using a different kind of method of organizing knowledge and determining facts. The organization of scientific knowledge into sets and subsets that is founded on a non-empirical evidentness and is idealized as being self-evident knowledge on the basis of a kind of historicism that is practiced in order to classify the embedding of scientific knowledge (organicism, evolutionary biology etc. as examples.) This abstract view of scientific knowledge is echoed in Foucault's equation of "Archaeology of Knowledge". And this equation comprises his work as a vortexual formula that focuses on the morphological similarities and the historical traits of the archeological method of producing evidence with how the notion of linguistic structuralism is pervasive in scientific literature. This Foucault draws out from a descriptive history of linguistic structure from the theme of the archive, its ordering principles - (and archeology with its stratigraphic modeling of time.) These two quantifiable terms are extracted in the process of the work yielding a singular phenomenon; the being of the lingue. The descriptive phenomenology of science is not invisible within the encyclopedia system of Hegel.

Following from an eidetic perview of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences we can say, after reading Hegel, that science is the 'natural history of abstraction'. Since it (science) progresses according to it's own natural history of it's discoveries by modeling the natural world; the generalized and secular categories of natural history are always reached from immediate experience. Like empirical knowledge abstract knowledge is not sequenced in linear time. Like natural history, science constructs it's generic hierarchies and organizational spheres from various periods of scientific discovery which does not progress in an exact sequence. The re-modeling of the historical, which archaeology illustrates by rediscovering meaningful artifacts for progressive scholarship to analyze and draw conclusion, is the necessary program and mission of the modern natural sciences as well. Post-industrial historiography generates the storyboard of science as universal and without ceasing to be scientific in a time of mass technological application. Scientific discovery was not the result of a constant use of method that progressed in a linear sequence through human history. Instead it barrows it's concept of being scientific from the social and dialectic order of abstraction. Hegel's compositional logic is the autodactic testimony of this abstracting done by science as a social program of correspondence discourse. History of science is hierarchical and cyclical in the post-industrial age where it takes off from the model of production maintained by the previous industrial revolutions. As one of the left-fields of capitalism the discourse known as history of science adjusts itself to the perspective of Galilean physics, with it's geocentric departure point, from which it reconstructs the progression myth of eminent science. Science depends on this selectively remodeling of itself based on the history of science that educates it.

Encyclopedic knowledge is first confronted in Hegel's Encyclopedia of the System of Science by use of Hegelian compositional logic. It is here that Hegel affirms that encyclopedic knowledge is a representation of scientific method, but only as a motif that lives within a connected model of logic and the history of philosophical sciences (i.e. the works of scientists such as Francis Bacon etc.)